INTRODUCTION
Hot plates are used for many applications in research laboratories and can be standalone devices (i.e., heating only) or can be a combination device that includes stirring functions. The ubiquitous nature of these devices can lead to a casual approach with respect to the hazards that they present. This complacency increases the risk of burn injuries and fires due to contact of skin, combustible materials, or flammable chemicals with hot surfaces. Many of these issues emerge due to human error, poor work practices, and failure to consider these interactions when selecting a hot plate or setting up an experiment. These issues are common and are not discussed in detail in here. However, as a result of events that have damaged facilities at each of the authors' institutions, we have become aware of a more insidious issue associated with the design of hot plates-specifically that these plates can heat spontaneously and/or uncontrollably under certain conditions. In this paper, we detail this problem and the results of our investigations into the extent of this issue and provide recommendations for the prevention of future occurrences.
On April 2nd, 2014 a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Event) and fire destroyed a laboratory chemical hood and caused significant damage to a laboratory at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. Portions of the combination sash were jettisoned across the room, damaging a flammable materials storage cabinet, and the heat of the fire burned a hole into the epoxy surface of the hood. The lab was unattended at the time of the event, and the hood was empty except for a combination hot plate and stirrer (aka stirring hotplate) and a closed 250 mL flask containing hexane. A vacuum pump below the hood was plugged in but turned off as was the heating controller on the hot plate (the stirring controller was in the "On" position). Although initial theories regarding the cause of the fire focused on the vacuum pump, it was later confirmed through forensic analysis that the hot plate had spontaneously and uncontrollably begun heating. An investigation into the reason and mechanism for this phenomenon is noted below.
HOT PLATE DESIGN AND OPERATION
In general, hot plates operate by applying power to a resistive circuit attached to a ceramic plate. The level of heating is controlled by varying the power provided to the resistor. Earlier designs for hot plates included bimetallic switches that controlled the duration of the power delivery cycle or mechanical switches, which directly controlled the amount of power provided to the heating element. More recent designs have incorporated a bidirectional or bilateral triode thyristor, more commonly known as a TRIAC, which is a solid state switching device embedded on a printed circuit board. This $ Notice: This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The US government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the US government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for US government purposes. DOE will provide public access to these results of federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan (http://energy.gov/downloads/ doe-public-access-plan).
provides indirect control of the power provided to the heating element. The use of a TRIAC in the hot plate design provides some improvement in safety over the previous designs due to reduced spark risk and potential corrosion of the bimetallic thermostat.
1
TRIACS also have the benefit of being relatively inexpensive to manufacturer in comparison to other technologies.
Following the fire at its own organization, Oak Ridge National Laboratory studied in detail the mechanisms by which hot plates incorporating TRIAC switches operate and how they could fail. In the paragraphs below and Figures 1-4 , the electrical schematics for the normal operational and potential failure modes for these devices are outlined.
At the start of normal operations, the hot plate is plugged into a receptacle, but the heat control switch is turned off. The microprocessor does not turn on the solid state switching component, and, therefore, no power reaches the hot plate heating element (Figure 3) . The heat control switch has been turned on. It provides an input to the microprocessor, which in turn sends a control signal to the switching component. The switching component controls the 120-V power to the heating element according to the microprocessor's signal (Figure 4) . The temperature feedback loop helps the microprocessor keep the heating element at the desired temperature. Unfortunately, a well-known failure mode of the switching component typically used in hot plates is that it fails closed (i.e., as a short circuit). A switching component in this condition will allow current to flow directly to the heating element, no longer responding to the microprocessor's control signal. As a result, the hot plate will heat to its maximum temperature. The temperature feedback loop is of no help in controlling the hot plate temperature. This hot plate has run away ( Figure 5 ). The heating control switch has been turned off. But, the failed solid state switching component still passes 120-V power to the heating element, permitting the hot plate to stay hot because the microprocessor cannot control the switching component ( Figure 6 ).
EXTENT OF CONDITION
At the time of the Oak Ridge fire, researchers and others at the facility were not aware of the propensity of certain hot plates to heat spontaneously or uncontrollably, nor the mechanism for this failure. Initial communications with other government laboratories indicated that the incident was isolated. However, after a second runaway hot plate was discovered (fortunately before any damage had occurred), efforts were made to determine the extent of this condition in order to determine appropriate corrective actions and to communicate this risk to others.
Information regarding the frequency of events involving runaway hot plates was obtained via internet searches of publicly available websites, discussions on the ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety List-service, and a survey conducted asking safety professionals their experience with his issue. Collectively, these sources revealed that numerous research institutions had experienced incidents involving hot plates over a long period of time-some with significant damage as a result. A summary of hot plate events that can be found on publicly available websites is shown in Table 1 .
Several of the event reports referenced in Table 1 provide detailed analysis of the cause of defective hot plates consistent with that described previously in this article, listings of models susceptible to runaway events, and/or recommendations for prevention of recurrence. Some of these are summarized later in this article. Information of this nature was also obtained from reports on other accessible websites 15 but which did not identify any specific events beyond those listed in Table 1 .
In 2017, a survey was conducted by members of the ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety to solicit additional information concerning hot plate failures and institutional failure prevention practices. This electronic survey was conducted using Google Forms and distributed via email on the ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety's e-mail list (DCHAS-L 16 ) as well as the Campus Safety Health and Emergency Management Association's community pages.
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The survey was conducted from April 12 through 21, 2017 and 25 individuals responded regarding their knowledge of incidents involving hot plates.
Twenty-one of the respondents to this anonymous survey reported a total of forty events involving hot plates, specifically citing: spontaneous heating (13), runaway/uncontrolled heating (19), or another unspecified malfunction (8) . Respondents identified five specific hot plate makes and models involved in these events (see below) and identified equipment ages ranging from over 5 years old (4) to under 5 years (6) with some hot plates of unknown age (3).
Like previous reports, the survey identified several specific hot plate models involved in the various events as shown in Table 2 . Information regarding damages incurred as a result of these events was also obtained as part of this survey, however they are not repeated here as the range of impacts (no impact to significant damage) are similar those reported in Table  1 .
In the time between the initiation of this project and its publication, several additional events have been brought to the attention of the authors via personal communications or as obtained from news reports. Given the pervasive use of hot plates in research laboratories, the number of events involving faulty hot plates far exceeds the limited number reported herein, and efforts to communicate this risk and prevent recurrence are warranted. Heating while in off position Large fire -significant damage to laboratory and smoke damage to facility
MINIMIZING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH RUNAWAY HOT PLATES
Approaches have been proposed or promulgated to prevent faulty hot plates. In our research, the approaches identified fall into two categories-elimination of the risk by replacing the susceptible hot plate models with versions that provide greater safety controls, and administratively controlling the risk by instituting policies for the continued use of hot plates susceptible to failure. Elimination is the most effective way to protect workers and facilities from this hazard and is recommended by the authors as the preferred method for addressing this hazard.
ELIMINATE HEATING FUNCTIONALITY
Many of the runaway/uncontrolled heating issues previously noted occurred on dual functionality hot plates that provide both heating and stirring capabilities, some occurring when only stirring was required (i.e., heat control in off position and stir control in the on position The implementation of such a campaign will necessarily vary with the organization, however attributes of successful programs have included providing incentives to encourage replacement, obtaining reduced pricing with vendors on preferred models, establishing a vendor or manufacturer lead trade-in program, or a combination of approaches.
We note here that it is still possible to obtain hot plates that have the errorprone TRIAC design (without additional safety controls) so prospective buyers should confirm systems designs and safety features prior to making a purchase.
PREVENTING RUNAWAY HOT PLATES VIA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES
In lieu of a program to eliminate failure prone hot plates, some institutions have opted to implement programs and policies to administratively control the hazard. While such administrative controls are by no means as effective as eliminating risk as engineering controls that eliminate the underlying problem, these may be selected as interim measures until a means to fund and execute a replacement campaign is available. Although this can be accomplished in a variety of ways, common policies include requiring attended operations during heating activities, and unplugging hot plates when not in use. It has been noted that even when an institution has made the effort to replace older hot plates, administrative policies and oversight may still be required to some extent to ensure that runaway prone hot plates do not re-enter use (through personnel moves or acquisition) and that requirements for proper use are disseminated to address issues not associated with equipment design.
Instructions and markings on hot plates listed to the UL 61010 series of standards inform the user to unplug the power cord when the hot plate is not in use. Many organizations remind employees to unplug hot plates when not in use. In many cases, the plug is accessible and can be removed from the supplying receptacle.
Situations frequently arise in which a hot plate's plug is not readily accessible. A typical reason for the power plug to be inaccessible is because the hot plate is inside a glove box, fume hood, or "hot cell" that has been sealed because the materials being studied or processed are particularly hazardous to persons, require a special atmosphere, or for similar reasons. Equipment (such as hot plates), glassware, chemicals, etc., are staged inside the glove box, fume hood or hot cell, and then the box, hood or cell will be sealed by various methods for the duration of the experiment or process. Operation of the hot plate controls is accomplished by utilizing gloves through the wall of a glove box, by remote mechanical manipulators, etc. In some cases, the receptacle supplying the hot plate is accessible after the equipment and materials are loaded in the glove box or fume hood and can be utilized to disable the hot plate remotely. But other times the glove box or fume hood contains materials in a configuration such that the receptacle cannot be reached and other (non-administrative) methods for controlling this hazard should be used.
Installation of a switched receptacle is a considered a good alternative to unplugging a hot plate, and this is encouraged when installing new glove boxes and fume hoods. However, modifying all of the existing glove boxes and fume hoods in use is expensive. In cases where older glove boxes or fume hoods are used to routinely handle radioactive or other hazardous materials, the cost of retrofitting switched receptacles could be prohibitive.
FIXING THE PROBLEM
While unplugging a hot plate when not in use is effective, the control is faulty. This approach was also irrelevant in some of the cases noted in this paper Hot plates, both combination and heat-only varieties, are an omnipresent piece of equipment in most chemistry laboratories. As an integral part of many research activities, they are used with and near a variety of potentially hazardous materials and environments, and even when functioning normally, can pose a hazard to the researcher if not used properly. Most researchers are aware of these potential hazards. However, we have found that many researchers are unaware that hot plates with certain design features may heat unexpectedly or uncontrollably.
A multi-faceted approach is needed to remedy this issue and address potential issues of hot plates already in use as well as those still being manufactured and sold. Publicity surrounding events that have caused injuries or significant damage to research facilities has encouraged many organizations to take action on the issue within their own domains. Additional effort is needed to increase awareness of the number of events that have occurred and the details surrounding the event. Actions of the American Chemical Society, the Pistoia Alliance, and University of California Center for Laboratory Safety to develop lessons learned databases to share this information can help with awareness. Researchers are encouraged to share their experiences when adverse events happen to make these awareness programs effective.
While informed institutions and individual researchers can take actions to eliminate or mitigate hazards associated with malfunctioning hot plates in their own laboratories, substantive actions taken by the manufacturers and distributors would have a significantly greater impact on educating the research community and preventing the propagation of failure-prone devices in the marketplace and the availability of devices with inherently safer designs. It is encouraging that many vendors are actively identifying product design features that improve safety, in addition to traditional focus on product specifications and performance. In addition, some vendors and distributors have participated in buyback or hot plate replacement programs.
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The actions of responsible vendors and distributors may be adversely affected if the initiatives are not adopted and sustained by the industry as a whole. The development or modification of standards that require safer designs for hot plates could have a significant impact in encouraging this result. To that end, in 2016 a request was made to the UL Standard Technical Panel for Standard 61010 which includes laboratory heating devices (specifically in respect to UL61010-2-010: UL Standard for Safety Electrical Equipment For Measurement, Control, and Laboratory Use) to consider adding a requirement to provide hot plates with a mechanical switching device (a switch, a contactor, etc.) that physically disconnects ac power to the heating element when the temperature control switch is turned to the "OFF" position. The issue was considered by the responsible committee in 2017, however no action was taken by the committee as they believed the standard adequately addressed the hazard.
CONCLUSION
In conducting research for this article, we have identified several reports of runaway hot plates, some with significant consequences. The failure of a solid-state "triac" component in some hot plates has been identified as the cause of many of these events. Hot plates based on this design are still in frequent use in research laboratories and can still be purchased through reputable vendors. Hot plates with inherently safer designs are available on the market, and while some organizations have made the effort to systematically replace the failure-prone design with the safer technology, many others remain unaware of the potential issue.
Efforts are being made, through this communication and through the work of organizations such as the ACS Division of Chemical Health and Safety, to increase researchers' awareness of this particular issue and to promulgate recommendations for safe use of heating devices. We note that manufacturers, distributors and standards organizations have the opportunity to have a major positive impact on the collective safety of their customers by eliminating the availability of hot plates susceptible to runaway heating and by supporting product standards that require more reliable safety features.
